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Abstract 
 
In the 1960s U.S. participation rates in secondary education were the highest in the 
world.  This is no longer true.  According to the OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development) data…enrollment rates of 16 and 17 year olds in Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden all exceed U.S enrollment rates by 10 percentage points or more. Graduation rates are 
also higher in these countries. 
 
Systems that hold high schools accountable for student learning are particularly difficult 
to design for five reasons.  First, high schools have multiple goals.  Second, measuring 
achievement in core academic subjects is more difficult for high school students than for 
elementary school students.  The third difficulty is that high school tests measure the 
cumulative result of ten to twelve years of schooling, not just what has been learned since the 
student entered high school.  The fourth difficulty is that when a test is not part of a course’s 
grade or important to the student in some other way, many high school students fail to put 
much effort into answering all the questions correctly and completely.  The fifth problem in 
holding schools accountable is the low quality and low standards of many of the high school 
tests used in accountability systems. 
 
“No Child Left Behind” tries to prevent this problem from arising by adding a provision to 
the ESEA rules on state standards and assessment. The law requires that a state’s academic 
standards include challenging student academic achievement standards that are aligned with 
the state’s academic content standards. 
 
Minimum Competency Exam (MCE) high school graduation requirements are the most 
common way that states make students accountable for learning.  Studies of the effect of 
MCEs have found that they increase college attendance and post high school earnings but 
have little effect on test score gains during high school and lower the probability that low GPA 
students get a high school diploma.  A number of states appear to be following a strategy of 
driving their educational systems to higher standards by periodically revising their MCE in order 
to set progressively higher minimum standards. 
 
Minimum Competency Exams create a High Stakes for a Few Students System: State 
tests determine or influence getting a diploma or promotion to the next grade but only a small 
minority of students are really at risk of being retained or being denied a diploma.  One benefit 
of High Stakes for a Few is that it focuses school efforts on helping its most poorly prepared 
students. 
 
Moderate Stakes for Everyone should be the objective, not high stakes for the few.       
A number of ideas for generating moderate rewards for learning are described in this paper.  
While states with no MCE have the greatest need to implement these approaches, these 
proposals can improve motivation and student culture in MCE states as well. 
 
 
 
 
This report was prepared for Office of Vocational and Adult Education, U. S. Department of 
Education pursuant to Contract Number ED-CO – 99-0160  -- Commissioned Papers: Linking 
Research to Policy and Practice.   The findings and opinions expressed in this report do not 
necessarily reflect the position or policies of the U.S. Department of Education. 
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What Should Be The Federal Role in Supporting and Shaping 
Development of State Accountability Systems 
for Secondary School Achievement? 
 
There is much to be proud of in American education.  Nearly 30 percent of the nation’s 
youth now obtain a four-year college degree.  The graduates of American universities have 
generated many of the major technological breakthroughs of the last quarter century.   Primary 
education is also quite successful.  In recent international assessments fourth graders in the 
U.S. placed number two in reading literacy, number three in science and number twelve (out of 
26) in mathematics. 
Secondary education, however, is a different story.  In the 1960s U.S. participation rates 
in secondary education were the highest in the world.  This is no longer true.  According to the 
OECD data presented in Table 1, enrollment rates of 16 and 17 year olds in Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden all exceed U.S enrollment rates by 10 percentage points or more.1  Graduation rates 
are also higher in these countries. 
The rate at which U.S. students learn new skills clearly decelerates during 
secondary school.   Gains on the TIMSS math and science assessments from 4th to 8th grade 
are smaller for the US than any other country [see columns 5 and 6 of Table 1].    The IEA 
Study of Reading Literacy had similar findings [see column 7].2  In the reading literacy study 
American students fell from their number two spot in fourth grade to 14th amongst 24 rich 
industrialized countries in ninth grade.3   The most telling indicator of the poor quality of 
American secondary schools is the TIMSS results for students at the end of secondary school 
(see column 9 and 10 of Table 1).  In mathematics seniors in U.S. high schools ranked 19th out 
of 21 nations, ahead of only Cyprus and South Africa. In science U.S. seniors ranked 16th out of 
21, ahead of Cyprus, Italy, Hungary, Lithuania and South Africa. 
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Table 1:  
Characteristics of Secondary Education Systems  
 
 
Enrollment 
Rate 
Upper 
Sec. 
S. 
Learning Index 
4th to 8th grade 
Math 
Age 
13 
End of 
Secondary 
Lower 
Sec. 
Teacher 
Upper 
Salary 
Teach 
Hours 
Salary 
Per 
Expend 
per 
student 
Teach 
Comp 
Student 
Hours 
% 
Absent 
 
Age 
16 
Age 
17 
Grad. 
Rate Math Science 
Read
ing  Math Science 
Salary 
In $ 
/GDP 
per 
cap 
per 
Year 
Teach 
Hours 
GDP 
Per cap 
%of 
total 
Per 
Year 
8th 
Grade 
Australia 97 81 --- 121 127 --- 499 522 527 $36,175 1.6 802 45 25 63 1027 7.1 
Belgium 94 93 84 --- --- -14 539 --- --- $27,932 1.55 685 40 29 78 1057 4.1 
Canada 99 83 72 133 130 +26 498 519 532 --- --- --- --- --- 64 --- 5.4 
Denmark 93 82 --- --- --- +50 514 547 509 $31,000 1.6 572 48 28 53 930 3.6 
Finland 89 93 89 --- --- -10 520 --- --- $27,942 1.3 457 58 25 60 855 --- 
France 95 88 87 --- --- +7 498 523 487 $29,615 1.3 620 47 31 --- 975 3.7 
Germany 96 91 93 --- --- +21 476 495 497 $38,640 1.9 710 53 28 --- 921 4.1 
Hungary 97 85 90 127 175 +44 504 483 471 $11,066 1.0 555 20 21 --- 902 4.4 
Italy 78 73 --- --- --- +3 479 476 475 $25,773 1.2 612 42 29 73 1105 --- 
Japan 96 94 96 148 140 --- 572 --- --- $41,201 1.7 --- --- 24 --- 875 2.1 
Korea 96 90 90 137 105 --- 591 --- --- $39,921 2.7 494 80 24 --- 867 0.9 
Netherland 96 85 93 103 150 +29 519 560 558 $31,380 1.9 910 34 23 --- 1067 3.0 
Norway 94 93 --- 138 150 -9 483 528 544 $23,879 … 558 39 26 --- 855 3.4 
Portugal 84 81 56 115 165 +35 416 --- --- $26,288 1.7 571 42 29 --- 878 5.0 
Spain 85 73 67 --- --- +2 452 --- --- $32,144 2.0 545 59 27 75 957 3.2 
Sweden 98 97 79 --- --- +7 497 559 552 $23,896 1.2 --- --- 27 44 741 4.4 
Switzerland 90 85 84 --- --- +21 519 540 523 $51,361 2.1 768 60 42 72 --- ---
U. K. 81 66 --- 130 149 --- 482 --- --- $38,010 1.7 798 48 23 51 720 6.0 
United 84 74 74 93 113 -15 472 461 480 $32,713 1.1 954 34 25 57 980 5.4 
 
Sources:  OECD, Education at a Glance , 2000, pp. 95, 103, 136, 147, 215, 237.   
Warwick Elley, How in the World do Students Read?  1972, p 108-9; Beaton, Albert et al. (1996)  
Mathematics [Science] Achievement in the Middle School Years: IEA's Third International Mathematics and Science Study.  
CSTEEP, Boston College, Boston, MA. http://timss.bc.edu/ .  Scores in italics are for 8th graders in TIMSS-R. 
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How do students who lead the world in 4th grade get transformed into cellar 
dwellers at the end of upper secondary school?   In the first section of the paper I examine 
seven proposed proximate causes of the poor performance of U.S. secondary schools.  I 
conclude that spending less money or spending less time in school is not responsible for our lag 
behind European competitors.  Rather the causes appear to be the quality of teachers, the 
academic standards set by teachers and administrators and the culture of secondary schools.  
The second section of the paper proposes an institutional mechanism for raising standards and 
improving student engagement and motivation: curriculum-based external exit examinations 
(CBEEES).  Studies of the impacts of CBEEES have found that they improve teaching and 
increase learning.  Section 3 describes the strategies that state governments in the U.S. have 
devised to reform secondary education.  Section 4 presents a summary of research my 
colleagues and I have conducted evaluating the effects of these strategies.  We have concluded 
that curriculum-based external exit exams are the most effective of the strategies being tried.  
Stakes for schools--rewarding schools that improve student performance and sanctioning schools 
that fail to meet targets for student achievement--are also effective.  High school graduation tests 
(minimum competency exams that must be passed to receive a high school diploma) do not 
appear to have big effects on test scores when other standards-based reforms are controlled.  
They do, however, have big effects on employer perceptions of the competence of recent high 
school graduates and on the wages and earnings of these graduates. 
The final section of the paper discusses the policy choices facing states and the U.S. 
Department of Education.  It provides guidance for writing regulations for the “No Child Left 
Behind” Act and proposes a modest federal investment in merit scholarships and other programs 
designed to improve school culture, teaching standards and student incentives to learn. 
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I. The Proximate Causes of the Poor Performance of American Secondary Schools: 
TEACHER QUALITY, STUDENT ENGAGEMENT and SCHOOL CULTURE 
We begin by examining the proximate causes of low achievement at the end of secondary school.  
The discussion is organized around seven topics--each of them a proposed explanation for the 
poor performance of U.S. students relative to their counterparts in northern Europe and East Asia. 
1) Teacher quality and compensation 
2) Expenditure per pupil 
3) Time devoted to instruction and study 
4) Engagement--Effort per unit of scheduled time 
5) Nerd Harassment—Peer Pressure against Studiousness 
6) Students Avoiding Rigorous Courses 
7) Pressures on Teachers to Lower Standards 
 
1.1 Teacher Quality and Compensation 
Teacher quality has big effects on student learning.  The teacher's general academic 
ability and subject knowledge are the characteristics that most consistently predict student 
learning (Hanushek 1971, Strauss and Sawyer 1986, Ferguson 1990, Ehrenberg and Brewer 
1993, Monk 1992). 
Unfortunately, teaching secondary school does not attract the kind of talent that is 
attracted into the profession in Europe and East Asia.  In 1999-2000 intended education majors 
had SAT scores that were 33 points below average in mathematics and 22 points below average 
on the verbal test (NCES 2000, Table 135).  School administrators are also remarkably willing to 
hire and assign staff to teach subjects that are outside their field of expertise and training.  
Teachers who neither majored nor minored in history in college teach more than half of secondary 
school history classes.  Teachers who did not major or minor in a physical science or engineering 
in college teach more than half of chemistry and physics students.4 
 Recent college graduates recruited into math or science teaching jobs spent only 30 
percent of their college career taking science and mathematics courses.  Since 46 percent had 
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not taken a single calculus course, the prerequisite for most advanced mathematics courses, it 
appears that most of the math taken in college was reviewing high school mathematics (NCES 
1993b, p. 428-429).  The graduates of the best American universities typically do not enter 
secondary school teaching because the pay and conditions of work are relatively poor. 
Despite the fact that wage rates and standards of living in the U.S. are higher than in any other 
OECD nation, there are six countries—Australia, Germany, Japan, Korea, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom—that have higher annual salaries for secondary school teachers (see column 11 
of Table 1). Comparisons of secondary school teacher salaries with per capita GDP are presented 
in column 12.  American upper secondary teachers with 15 years of experience are paid only 10 
percent more than the nation’s per capita GDP.   In Europe and East Asia by contrast salaries for 
teachers with 15 years of experience are on average 65 percent higher than per capita GDP 
(OECD, 2000, p. 215). 
 The lower pay in the United States is not a tradeoff for more attractive conditions of work. 
Indeed the working conditions of U.S. secondary school teachers are considerably less attractive.  
Their contracted teaching hours are 954 hours per year on average; 50 percent more then the 
mean for the other OECD nations in the table--635 hours (OECD, 2000, p. 229).  When you divide 
their annual salaries by the contracted number of teaching hours, lower secondary school 
teachers with 15 years of experience are paid only $34.00 per hour.  The average for the other 
OECD countries is $47.66, forty percent more (OECD, 2000, p. 16).  In other occupations hourly 
wages are higher in the US.  Why do we pay our secondary school teachers so little?  Is 
standards based reform likely to improve the qualifications and pay of teachers?  These questions 
are taken up later in the paper. 
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1.2 School Expenditures 
 When expenditures per secondary school student are deflated by a purchasing power 
parity price index, the U.S. spends more than other countries with sole exception of Switzerland.  
However, teachers of constant quality are more expensive in America than in Europe and East 
Asia because college graduates (the pool of workers from which teachers must be drawn) are 
better paid.  Since labor compensation is the bulk of education costs, the proper deflator for 
schooling expenditure is not a general cost of living index, but a wage index that reflects among 
other things the cost of recruiting competent teachers.  Lacking such an index, deflation by GDP 
per capita is the next best thing.  OECD's latest estimates of the ratio of per pupil spending for 
secondary schools to per capita GDP are given in column 15 of Table 1.  By this indicator most 
countries are pretty similar. The U.S. secondary school spending ratio is 7.4 percent below the 
average for the other nations in the table (OECD, 2000, p. 95). 
 How is it possible for the U.S. to pay its teachers so little and yet end up spending so 
much on secondary education?  Japan and Korea keep per pupil costs down by increasing class 
size substantially above U.S. levels.   Europe, however, does not.  Pupil teacher ratios in Europe 
and the U.S. are very similar.  What’s happening to the money saved by paying American 
teachers low hourly wages?  It’s being used to provide a variety of non-instructional services such 
as after-school sports, bus transportation, psychological counseling, medical check ups, after-
school day care, hot meals, and driver education that other countries typically assign to other 
institutions.  In Japan and Europe students use public transportation to commute to school, so 
transportation is not charged to the school budget.  In many European countries, local 
governments, not schools, sponsor after-school sports programs.  These additional functions of 
American schools require extra non-teaching staff.  Non teachers account for 22 percent of 
current expenditure on K-12 education in the US; only 14 percent of current expenditure in other 
OECD nations (see column 16 of Table 1).5   If adjustments were made for service mix and a 
cost-of-education index reflecting compensation levels in alternative college-level occupations 
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were used to deflate expenditure, the U.S. advantage in instructional spending per pupil would 
drop. 
1.3 Time Devoted to Instruction 
Many studies have found learning to be strongly related to time on task (Wiley 1986, 
Walberg 1992).    OECD estimates of annual hours of instruction for 14-year-old students are 
presented in column 9 of Table 1.  These numbers contradict the widely held belief that U.S. 
students do poorly because of shorter school days and shorter school years.   Only 5 of the 
OECD countries in the table assign their students to attend classes for more hours per year than 
the United States.  Twelve countries have their 14 year olds in school for less time.   Why does 
an hour of instruction in European and East Asian classrooms produce more learning than 
in American classrooms? 
 
1.4 Engagement--Effort per Unit of Scheduled Time 
 Classroom observation studies reveal that American students actively engage in learning 
activities for only about half the time they are scheduled to be in a classroom.  A study of schools 
in Chicago found that public schools with high-achieving students averaged about 75 percent of 
class time for actual instruction; for schools with low achieving students, the average was 51 
percent of class time (Frederick, 1977).  Overall, Frederick, Walberg and Rasher (1979) estimated 
46.5 percent of the potential learning time is lost due to absence, lateness, and inattention. 
 Just as important as the amount of time participating in a learning activity is the intensity of 
the student's involvement in the process.  The high school teachers surveyed by John Goodlad 
(1983) ranked "lack of student interest" as the most important problem in education and “lack of 
parent interest” as the second most important problem.  Why is student engagement so low?  
Poor teaching possibly, but there is other explanations as well. 
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1.5 Nerd Harassment 
 Probably the most important reason for lack of student engagement in the U.S. is a peer 
culture that is often hostile to studiousness and public displays of enthusiasm for academic 
learning.  Twenty four percent of the 95,000 secondary school students recently surveyed by the 
Educational Excellence Alliance said “My friends make fun of people who try to do well in school.”  
Interviews I conducted of middle school boys in Ithaca New York in 1996 and 1997 revealed that 
most of them internalized a norm against “sucking up” to the teacher.   How does a boy avoid 
being thought a “Suck up?”   He: 
• Avoids giving the teacher eye contact 
• Does not hand in homework early for extra credit, 
• Does not raise his hand in class too frequently, and 
• Talks or passes notes to friends during class (signaling that you value friends more than 
your rep with the teacher). 
  
 Similarly, Steinberg, Brown and Dornbusch’s recent study of nine high schools in 
California and Wisconsin concluded that: 
...less than 5 percent of all students are members of a high-achieving crowd that defines 
itself mainly on the basis of academic excellence...  Of all the crowds the ‘brains’ were 
the least happy with who they are--nearly half wished they were in a different crowd.6 
   
Why are the studious called suck ups, dorks and nerds or accused of “acting white”?  
Why are students who disrupt the class or try to get the class off track, not sanctioned by their 
classmates?  In part, it is because many teachers grade on a curve and this means trying hard to 
do well in a class is making it more difficult for others to get top grades.  When exams are graded 
on a curve or college admissions are based on rank in class, joint welfare is maximized if no one 
puts in extra effort.  In the repeated game that results, side payments--friendship and respect--and 
punishments—ridicule, harassment and ostracism--enforce the cooperative "don't study much, 
hang out instead" solution.  If, by contrast, students were evaluated relative to an outside 
standard, they would no longer have a personal interest in getting teachers off track or persuading 
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each other to refrain from studying.  Peer pressure demeaning studiousness might diminish.  We 
will return to this issue later in the paper. 
1.6 Student Preference for Easy Courses 
 Although research has shown that learning gains are substantially larger when students 
take honors and AP courses,7 enrollment in these courses is quite limited.  In many schools 
guidance counselors allow only a select few into these courses.  Many students prefer easy 
courses.  In the 1987 survey, 62 percent of 10th graders agreed with the statement, "I don't like 
to do any more school work than I have to." 8    Parents often agree with their child.  As one 
guidance counselor described: 
A lot of... parents were in a ‘feel good’ mode.”…If they [ the students] felt it 
was too tough, they would back off.  I had to hold people in classes, hold 
the parents back.  [I would say] “Let the kid get C’s.  It’s OK. Then they’ll 
get C+’s and then B’s.”  [But they would demand,] “No! I want my kid out 
of that class!” 9 
 
Rigorous courses are avoided because the rewards for the extra work are small for most 
students. While selective colleges evaluate grades in the light of course demands, many 
colleges have, historically, not factored the rigor of high school courses into their admissions 
decisions.  Trying to counteract this problem, college admissions officers have been telling 
students that they are expected to take the most rigorous courses offered by their school.  This 
effort has met with some success.  More students are taking chemistry and physics and advanced 
mathematics.  But many students have not gotten the message and still think taking easy courses 
is a good strategy.   One student told a reporter: 
My counselor wanted me to take Regents history and I did for a while.  But it 
was pretty hard and the teacher moved fast.  I switched to the other history 
and I'm getting better grades.  So my average will be better for college.10 
 
Consequently, the bulk of students who do not aspire to attend selective colleges 
quite rationally avoid rigorous courses and demanding teachers. 
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1.7 Pressure on Teachers to Lower Standards 
 When teachers try to set high standards, they often get pressured to go easy.  Thirty 
percent of American teachers say they "feel pressure to give higher grades than students' work 
deserves."  Thirty percent also feel pressured "to reduce the difficulty and amount of work you 
assign."11 
 Students also pressure teachers to go easy.  Sizer's description of Ms. Shiffe's biology 
class, illustrates what sometimes happens: 
 She wanted the students to know these names.  They did not want to know them 
and were not going to learn them.  Apparently no outside threat--flunking, for 
example--affected the students.  Shiffe did her thing, the students chattered on, 
even in the presence of a visitor....Their common front of uninterest probably made 
examinations moot.  Shiffe could not flunk them all, and, if their performance was 
uniformly shoddy, she would have to pass them all.  Her desperation was as 
obvious as the students' cruelty toward her. (1984 p. 157-158) 
   
 Some teachers are able, through the force of their personalities, to induce their students to 
undertake tough learning tasks.  But for all too many, academic demands are compromised 
because the bulk of the class sees no need to accept them as reasonable and legitimate.  Why 
are American students more interested in diplomas than in learning?  Why are rewards for 
learning so weak?  Why do school administrators assign staff to teach subjects they did not study 
in college? 
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II. WEAK ORGANIC ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS as ULTIMATE CAUSE: 
External Examinations as Standard Setters and a Way of Boosting the Rewards for 
Learning 
Most of the problems listed above are not present in Northern Europe and East Asia.  Why 
are standards higher there?  Why are school administrators more focused on students’ academic 
achievement?  If citizens of Japan, Korea, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands 
and a host of other countries were asked these questions, they would point to their nation’s 
system of curriculum-based external exit examinations (CBEEES).  These examinations systems 
provide a strong and organic system of accountability.  High stakes are attached to how students 
do on these exams.  Exam grades appear on resumes and are requested on job applications.  
Exam grades influence (and in some nations completely determine) whether a student can enter a 
university and which university and what field of study they are admitted to.   In the United States, 
by contrast, admission to the best colleges depends on teacher assessments of relative 
performance--rank in class and grades--and multiple choice format aptitude tests that are not 
keyed to the courses taken in secondary school.  Employers pay little attention to achievement in 
high school when making hiring decisions.  Clearly CBEEES strengthen student incentives to 
study.  Students are no longer competing with each other for a limited number or As and Bs.  
Everyone in the class can get a 90 or better on the external exam, so students will be less 
supportive of those who disrupt the class and more supportive of those who take learning 
seriously.  It no longer makes sense for students to avoid the more rigorous courses and the more 
demanding teachers. 
CBEEES fundamentally change how student achievement is signaled.  By doing so they 
organically transform the incentives for everyone: parents, teachers and secondary school 
administrators as well as students. In the U.S. local school administrators serving at the pleasure 
of locally elected school boards make the thousands of decisions that determine academic 
expectations and program quality.   When there is no external assessment of academic 
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achievement, students, parents and local taxpayers benefit little from administrative decisions that 
opt for higher standards, more qualified teachers or a heavier student work load.  The immediate 
consequences of such decisions are all negative: higher local property taxes, more homework, 
having to repeat courses, lower GPA's, complaining parents and a greater risk of being denied a 
diploma. 
College admission decisions are based on rank in class, GPA and aptitude tests, not 
externally assessed achievement in secondary school courses, so upgraded standards will not 
improve the college admission prospects of next year's graduates.  Graduates will probably do 
better in difficult college courses and will be more likely to get a degree, but that benefit is 
uncertain, far in the future and not visible to voters in school board elections.  In this environment, 
administrators will seek teachers who keep their class orderly and entertained, who have roots in 
the community and who are willing to coach.   If this is all one expects of teachers, sufficient 
numbers can be found at current salary levels.  If, however, administrators were to demand that 
newly hired teachers have a deep knowledge of their subject and the ability to teach it to 
teenagers, they would find that there are not enough qualified teachers to go around.  The 
shortage would not disappear until much higher salaries were offered.  External exams make 
stake holders care about how well high school subjects are taught.   Hiring better teachers and 
improving the school's science laboratories now yields a visible payoff--more students passing the 
external exams and being admitted to top colleges.  This should induce school districts to 
compete for talent by offering higher salaries and better working conditions. 
When external assessment is absent, school reputations are determined largely by school 
characteristics over which teachers and administrators have no control: the socio-economic status 
of the student body and the proportion of graduates going to college. Consequently, higher 
standards do not benefit students as a group, so parents as a group have little incentive to lobby 
for higher teacher salaries, higher standards and higher school taxes.  Under a system of external 
exams, teachers and local school administrators lose the option of lowering standards to reduce 
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failure rates and raise self-esteem.  The only response open to them is to demand more of their 
students so as to maximize their chances of being successful on the external exams. 
External assessment of accomplishment puts students, teacher and parents on the same 
team.  It assists the development of mentoring relationships between teachers and students.  In 
the absence of external assessment, the effort to become friends with one's students and their 
parents tends to deteriorate into extravagant praise for mediocre accomplishment.  In courts of 
law, judges must disqualify themselves when a friend comes before the bar.  Yet, American 
teachers are placed in this double bind every day.  Often the role conflict is resolved by lowering 
expectations.  Other times the choice of high standards means that close supportive relationships 
are sacrificed. 
A further benefit of CBEEES is the professional development that teachers receive when 
they come to centralized locations to grade the extended answer portions of examinations. In May 
1996 I interviewed a number of teachers union activists about the examination system in the 
Canadian province of Alberta.  Even though the union and these teachers opposed the exams, 
they universally reported that serving on grading committees was  “…a wonderful professional 
development activity (Bob, 1996).”   Having to agree on what constituted excellent, good, poor, 
and failing responses to essay questions or open ended math problems resulted in a sharing of 
perspectives and teaching tips that most found very helpful. 
CBEEES should, consequently, influence the resources made available to schools, the 
priorities of school administrators, teacher pedagogy, parental for schools and student effort. 
Careful empirical analysis of data from the Third International Mathematics and Science 
Study (TIMSS and TIMSS-R) and the International Assessment of Educational Progress has 
found that teaching is more rigorous and students learn more in nations with CBEEES.12  
Thirteen-year-old students from countries with CBEEE systems outperform students from other 
countries at a comparable level of economic development by .67 to 2.0 grade level equivalents 
(GLE) in mathematics, science, geography and reading literacy.  Closer to home, students in 
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Canadian provinces with diploma exams were a statistically significant .5 GLE ahead in math and 
science of comparable students in other provinces 
The impacts of CBEEES on school policies and instructional practices have also been 
studied.  CBEEES are associated with higher minimum standards for becoming a teacher, higher 
teacher salaries (30-34 percent higher for secondary school teachers) and a greater likelihood of 
hiring teachers who have majored in the subject they are assigned to teach and specialize in 
teaching it.  Schools in CBEEES jurisdictions equip better science labs, devote more hours to 
math and science instruction and provide after school tutoring to more students. 
Fears that CBEEES have caused the quality of instruction to deteriorate appear to be 
unfounded.  Students in CBEEES jurisdictions were less likely to say that memorization is the way 
to learn the subject and more likely to do experiments in science class.  Quizzes and tests were 
more common, but in other respects pedagogy was no different.  They were no less likely to like 
the subject and they were more likely to agree that “science is useful in every day life.”  Students 
also talked with their parents more about schoolwork and reported their parents had more positive 
attitudes about the subject. 
What do these positive findings regarding the organic accountability effects of 
curriculum-based external exit exams in other countries suggest about how our standards 
based reform efforts should be structured? 
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III.  STANDARDS-BASED REFORM 
American policy makers are trying to deal with the low standards and weak incentives for 
hard study by making students, staff and schools more accountable for learning.  The education 
departments of the 50 states have responded by developing content standards for core 
academic subjects, administering tests assessing this content to all students, publishing 
individual school results and holding students and schools accountable for student 
achievement.  While these efforts are generically referred to as standards-based reform, the 
mix of initiatives varies a great deal from state to state. 
Domestic Curriculum-Based External Examination Systems 
 While many states--Maryland, Georgia, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Tennessee, 
Texas, Virginia, Michigan, etc.—are developing end-of-course exams for key high school subjects 
and appear to be planning to implement a CBEEES, only two states—New York and North 
Carolina—actually had one during the 1990s.  State sponsored systems of end-of-course exams 
are described in Table 2.  The grand daddy of these examination systems is New York’s Regents 
exam system.  It has been in continuous operation since the 1860s.   Panels of local teachers 
grade the exams using rubrics supplied by the state Board of Regents.  Exam scores appear on 
transcripts and are the final exam mark that is averaged with the teacher’s quarterly grades to 
calculate the final course grade.    A college bound student taking a full schedule of Regents 
courses would typically take Regents exams in mathematics and earth science at the end of 9th 
grade; mathematics, biology and global studies exams at the end of 10th grade; mathematics, 
chemistry, American history, English and foreign language exams at the end of 11th grade and a 
physics exam at the end of 12th grade.  However, taking Regents courses and therefore Regents 
exams was voluntary until late in the 1990s.  Prior to 1998 nearly half of students chose to take 
‘local’ courses intended originally for non-college bound students and where good grades could 
be obtained without much effort. 
North Carolina introduced end-of-course exams for Algebra 1 and 2, Geometry, Biology, 
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Chemistry, Physics, Physical Science, American History, Social Science and English 1 between 
1988 and 1991.  Other versions of these courses not assessed by a state test do not exist, so 
virtually all North Carolina high school students take at least six of these exams. Test scores 
appear on the student’s transcript and most teachers have been incorporating EOC exam scores 
in course grades.  Starting in the year 2000, state law requires the EOCE tests to have at least a 
25% weight in the final course grade.  Clearly from this description one can see that North 
Carolina’s end-of-course exams and New York’s Regents Exams prior to 1999 carried low to 
moderate stakes for students, not high stakes. 
Most states pursuing standards based reform have established test based school 
accountability systems and high stakes minimum competency high school graduation exams 
(MCEs) that are quite different from CBEEES. 
What Should Be the Federal Role  CAHRS WP02-08 
  
 
Page 20 
Table 2:  End-of-Course Examination Systems 
State 
Year 
Announ
ced 
Subjects 
(year first administered) 
Score 
On  
Tran- 
script 
Part of 
Course 
Grade 
Teach-
ers 
Grade 
Exam 
Honors 
Diploma 
based 
on 
EOCE 
When 
MCE 
began 
EOCE can 
substitute 
for MCE 
Other Rewards for Student 
Achievement 
New  York  1865 
English, Math (3), Biology, 
Chemistry, Physics, U.S. History, 
World History, Latin, Foreign 
Languages, Intro. to Occupations 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
(40%) 
 
1979 
about 
1992 
In 1950s Scholarships were based on 
Regents exams. Use in teacher 
assessment is a local option. Becomes 
primary HS Grad. Test after 2000-03 
North 
Carolina 1984 
Algebra 1 & Biology (1987), 
Algebra 2 & US History (1988), 
Chem. & Geometry (1989) Eng. 1, 
Physics & Soc. Studies  (1990-1), 
 
Yes 
Most 
(after 
2000 
25%) 
 
Yes 
 
2003 
 
1980 
 
No 
 
State Tests at earlier grades influence 
retention decisions 
 
California 
 
1983 
Algebra I & Geometry (1987), 
U.S. History & Economics (1990), 
Biology & Chemistry (1991), 
Coord.  Science (1994), Writing 
(1996), Civics (1997), Liter. & H.S. 
Math (1998), Physics & Spanish 
(1999) 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes (1%) 
 
2004 
 
No 
 
State tests at earlier grades influence 
retention decisions 
Texas 1992 Biology (1995), Algebra I (1996), US History & English (1999) Yes 
Most 
(Req. in 
Future) 
? No 1987 2000 
Scholarships based on course rigor and 
family income.  State tests at earlier 
grades influence retention decisions. 
Tennessee 1992 
Alg. 1, Biology & English II (2001) 
Algebra 2, Geometry, Eng I 
(2002), US Hist, Chem. & Physics 
(2003) 
Yes Yes ? No 1985 2005 Becomes the HS graduation test in 2005.  Current Honors Diploma based on GPA. 
Maryland 1995 English 1, Civics, Algebra, Geometry & Biology (2001), Yes ? ? No 1983 2007 
Becomes the HS graduation test in 2007. 
Honors Diploma based on rigorous 
courses and GPA starts in 1998 
Mississippi 1994 Algebra & US History (1997), Biology (1998) ? ? ? No 1989 No 
Merit Scholarship based on GPA and ACT 
scores. 
Virginia 1996 
English, Algebra 1 & 2, Geometry, 
Earth Science, Biology. Chemistry, 
US Hist, World Hist. (1998) 
Yes some ? Yes 1981 2004 
Becomes HS graduation test in 2004. 
State tests at earlier grades influence 
retention decisions 
Oklahoma 1999 English & US History (2000), Math & Biology (2001) Yes No No No none No 
State Univ and Employers encouraged to 
use EOCE 
Arkansas 1997 Math (1999), English. (2002), Science & History ( 2004) Yes No No No none No 
State tests at earlier grades influence 
retention decisions 
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Minimum Competency Graduation Exams 
Eighteen states have minimum competency exam graduation requirements applying to the 
graduating class of 2000.  Another eleven states are developing or phasing in MCEs.    MCEs 
raise standards, but probably not for everyone.13  The standards set by the teachers of honors 
classes and advanced college prep classes are not changed by an MCE.  Students in these 
classes pass the MCE on the first try without special preparation.  The students who are in the 
school’s least challenging courses experience the higher standards.  Students pursuing the “Do 
the Minimum” strategy are told “you must work harder” if you are to get the diploma and go to 
college.  School administrators want to avoid high failure rates, so they are likely to focus 
additional energy and resources on raising standards in the early grades and improving the 
instruction received by struggling students. 
School Report Cards and Stakes for Teachers and Administrators. 
 So far we have discussed mechanisms for holding students accountable for learning.  
Formal systems for holding schools accountable are growing in popularity.  In 1999 thirty-seven 
states were publishing school report cards for all or almost all of their schools.14  Publicly 
identifying low performing schools is intended to spur local school administrators and boards of 
education to undertake remedial action.  Nineteen states had a formal mechanism for rewarding 
schools either for year-to-year gains in achievement test scores or for exceeding student 
achievement targets.15  Nineteen states had special assistance programs to help failing schools 
turn themselves around.  If improvements were not forthcoming, eleven states had the power to 
close down, take over or reconstitute failing schools. 
 Exactly how are domestic student and school accountability strategies similar to or 
different from the CBEEES that are found abroad and in New York and North Carolina?   We 
begin by noting the features they have in common.  Minimum competency exams: 
 
1. Produce signals of accomplishment that have real consequences for students and 
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schools.  While some stakes are essential, high stakes may not be necessary.  Analyses 
of Canadian and US data summarized below suggest that moderate stakes may be 
sufficient to produce substantial increases in learning. 
2. Cover all or almost all students. 
3. Define achievement relative to an external standard, not relative to other students in 
the classroom or the school. 
4. Assess a major portion of what students are expected to know and be able to do.  
Studying to prepare for an exam (whether set by one’s own teacher or by a state 
department of education) should result in the student learning important material and 
developing valued skills.  Some MCEs, CBEEES and teacher exams do a better job of 
achieving this goal than others.  External exams, however, cannot assess every 
instructional objective.  Teachers should be responsible for evaluating dimensions of 
performance that cannot be reliably assessed by external means or that local leaders want 
to add to the learning objectives specified by the state department of education. 
5. Are controlled by the education authority that establishes the curriculum for and 
funds K-12 education.  Curriculum reform is facilitated because coordinated changes in 
instruction and exams are feasible.  Tests established and mandated by other organizations 
serve the interests of other masters.  America’s premier high stakes exams--the SAT-I and 
the ACT—serve the needs of colleges to sort students by aptitude, not the needs of 
schools to reward students who have learned what high schools are trying to teach. 
 
Curriculum-based external exit exam systems are distinguished from MCEs by the 
following additional features.  CBEEES: 
1. Signal multiple levels of achievement in the subject.  If only a pass-fail signal is 
generated by an exam and passing is necessary to graduate, the standard will almost 
inevitably to be set low enough to allow almost everyone to pass after multiple tries.  This will 
not stimulate the great bulk of students to greater effort. CBEEES signal the student’s 
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achievement level in the subject, so all students, not just those at the bottom of the class, 
have an incentive to study hard to do well on the exam.   Consequently, CBEEES should 
be more likely to improve classroom culture than a MCE. 
2. Assess more difficult material. Since CBEEES are supposed to measure and signal the 
full range of achievement in the subject, they contain more difficult questions and 
problems. This induces teachers to spend more time on cognitively demanding skills and 
topics.  MCEs, by contrast, are designed to identify which students have failed to surpass 
a rather low minimum standard, so they do not to ask questions or set problems that 
students near that borderline are unlikely to be able to answer or solve.16  This tends to 
result in too much class time being devoted to practicing low-level skills. 
3. Are collections of End-of-Course Exams (EOCE).   Since they assess the content of 
specific courses, the teacher/s of that course (or course sequence) will inevitably feel 
responsible for how well their students do on the exam.  Grades on EOCEs should be a 
part of the overall course grade further integrating the external exam into the classroom 
culture.  Alignment between instruction and assessment is maximized and accountability 
is enhanced.  Proponents argue that teachers will not only want to set higher standards, 
they will find their students more attentive in class and more likely to complete demanding 
homework assignments.  They become coaches helping their team do battle with the state 
exam. 
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IV.   AMERICAN EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF STANDARD-BASED REFORM 
Improvements in student performance on state exams are often cited as evidence that 
school accountability initiatives are working.   Opponents disagree.  Test scores have gone up, 
they say, because test preparation is displacing the teaching of other skills and knowledge that 
are more important to success in college and in jobs.  This is a testable hypothesis.   Bishop, 
Mane, Bishop and Moriarty (2001) and Bishop, Mane and Bishop (2000) have tested it by 
measuring the effects of accountability systems on college enrollment and labor market success 
after high school of a representative sample of eighth graders in 1988.  We also measured 
impacts on academic achievement.  To avoid teaching to the test effects we used achievement 
tests—the NAEP and NELS: 88 tests—which are quite different from those used by the state 
accountability systems being evaluated. 
States have introduced different packages of standards based reform initiatives, so we 
assessed their impacts by comparing outcomes in different states. We studied the impact of one 
old style reform—state mandated minimum course graduation requirements—and three 
different SBR policies: 
1. Rewards for schools that improve on statewide tests and/or sanctions for failing 
schools—closure, reconstitution, loss of accreditation etc. [Since few states had 
implemented these policies prior to 1992, they are not included in our study of 
1988 eighth graders] 
2. Minimum competency exams 
3. Curriculum-Based External Exit Exam System--i.e. the New York/North Carolina 
stakes for students policy mix during the 1990s. 
 
The primary data set—NELS:88--provides six years of longitudinal data on 14,000 
students who were 8th graders in 1988.  Family background is a powerful predictor of high 
school completion, academic achievement, college attendance and labor market success, so 
our analyses included controls for a long list of socio-demographic characteristics of the 
student.  We also controlled for the characteristics of the high school and the community—type 
of private school, teacher salary, pupil-teacher ratio, mean eighth grade test scores, ethnic and 
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socio-economic composition of the student body, local unemployment rates, wage rates and the 
payoff to and tuition costs of college attendance.  The eighth graders who subsequently 
dropped out of high school were tested and interviewed in 1992 and 1994 and so are included 
in the analysis sample. 
Effects on College Attendance: Estimates of effects on the proportion of 8th graders who 
subsequently went to college are presented in Figure 1.  The **s above a bar indicates that the 
outcome is significantly greater in MCE states at the 2.5 percent level.  A * indicates 
significantly greater at the 5 percent level.  A + above a bar indicates significantly greater at the 
10 percent significance level.  MCEs significantly increased the percentage of 8th graders who 
were attending college 6 years later (by 2.3 to 4.4 percentage points depending on GPA in 8th 
grade).  CBEEES substantially increased college attendance rates of students with low GPAs in 
8th grade.  College attendance rates of high GPA students were unaffected. 
Effects on Labor Market Success: Estimates of effects of exit exams on annual earnings 
are presented in Figure 2.  Controlling on high school completion and college attendance, 
students who attended high school in states with MCEs earned significantly more--9 percent 
more in the calendar year following graduation-- than students in states without MCEs.17 
Effects on Test Scores: Our estimates of the effects of state imposed graduation 
requirements on scores on National Assessment of Educational Progress 8th grade assessments 
are summarized in Figure 3.18  Estimates of the effect of graduation requirements on test score 
gains from 8th to 12th grade are presented in Figure 4. 
The policy that clearly had the biggest effects on test scores was curriculum-based 
external exit examinations—the combination of EOCEs and MCEs that has been in place in 
New York State since the early 1980s and in North Carolina since about 1991.  In comparison 
to students in states without MCEs or CBEEES, 8th graders in New York and North Carolina 
were about 45 percent of a grade level equivalent (GLE) ahead in math and science and 65 
percent of a GLE ahead in reading.   In addition, test score gains from 8th to 12th grade were 
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nearly 40 percent of a grade level equivalent greater in New York State. This confirms and 
extends earlier findings that New York students did significantly better on SAT tests and the 
1992 8th grade NAEP math tests than other states with demographically similar populations 
(Bishop, Moriarty and Mane 2000). 
The next most powerful state policy was academic course graduation requirements.  
Students living in states that set academic course graduation requirements four units higher 
learn about one-third of a grade level equivalent more during high school. 
The next most powerful SBR policy was stakes for teachers and schools particularly 
when rewards for successful schools were combined with sanctions for failing schools.  The 
bars in Figure 3 depict our estimate of the effect of a state both rewarding schools for success 
and threatening to sanction failing schools.  Students in these states were 20 percent of a GLE 
ahead in math and science of demographically comparable students in states that did neither.  
They were 24 percent of a GLE ahead in reading.  Public reporting of school level results on 
state tests is necessary for the implementation of these policies, but on its own it had no 
discernable effect on student achievement. 
When other SBR policies were held constant, the positive effects of state imposed 
MCEs on achievement were small and statistically insignificant. While state imposed MCEs had 
no significant effects on learning gains of students with average or above average grades in 8th 
grade, students with low GPAs learned more math and science when they lived in MCE states. 
The policy having the smallest effects was state imposed elective and non-academic 
course graduation requirements.  They had no effects on test score gains during high school, 
no effects on earnings after high school and lowered college attendance rates. 
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Fig. 1--”Effects” of State Minimum Competency Exams and
End-of-Course Exams on 8th Graders 
Attending College 6 years later in 1993/94
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Figure 2--Annual Earnings of Workers in 1993 by 
8th grade GPA & State Minimum Competency Exam
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Figure 3--Effects of Standards-Based Reform 
Initiatives on NAEP 8th Grade Test Scores
0 %
1 0 %
2 0 %
3 0 %
4 0 %
5 0 %
6 0 %
7 0 %
T e st  S c o r e  S ta k e s
fo r  S c h o o ls  
M in im u m  C o m p .
E x a m s
E n d -o f-C o u r se
E x a m s--N Y  &  N C
R e a d in g
M a th e m a tic s
S c ie n c e
Percent of a 
Grade Level Equivalent
Source: Analysis of 1996 & 1998 state NAEP data.  Controls included for parent’s 
education, poverty, % Black, % Hispanic or Native American and %foreign born.  Education 
***
**
++
*
What Should Be the Federal Role  CAHRS WP02-08 
  
 
Page 30 
Fig. 4—’Effects’ of Graduation Requirements
on 8th to 12th Grade Test Score Gains 
by GPA in 8th Grade
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Whose predictions were correct?   Our analysis of college attendance rates, labor 
market success and test scores overwhelmingly rejects the hypotheses that test based 
accountability systems hurt students by inducing teachers to teach to severely flawed tests.  
Indeed the estimated impacts of test-based accountability policies on indicators of success after 
high school are positive, not negative as predicted by SBR critics. Indeed, it is the predictions of 
SBR supporters—that student and school accountability policies help students get better jobs 
and stay in college longer—that receive support.  In addition, scores on tests that are not part of 
state accountability systems are higher in states with strong SBR policies.  Thus, most students 
benefit from SBR policies.  There are, however, some who lose out--those who would have 
graduated under the old rules but do not graduate because they cannot pass the tests.  How 
large are these effects? 
Effects on High School Graduation Rates: Our analysis of longitudinal data is presented 
in Figure 5.  We found that the graduation rates of students with average or above average 
grades in 8th grade were not affected by state MCEs.  However, students with C- grades in 8th 
grade were significantly (7.7 percentage points) less likely to get a high school diploma or a 
Graduate Equivalency Diplomas (GED) within 6 years when they lived in a MCE state.  
Graduation rates of students living in New York were no different from the graduation rates in 
states without MCEs.  The share of students getting GEDs also went up in MCE and CBEEES 
states. 
Figure 6 summarizes an analysis of state data on the ratio of diplomas awarded by 
public schools in 1998 to 8th grade public school enrollment in the fall of 1993.  Figure 7 
summarizes an analysis of state data on the ratio of diplomas awarded by public and private 
schools to the number of 17 year olds in the state in 1997 through 1999. States with higher 
non-academic course graduation requirements had significantly lower high school graduation 
rates. States with larger secondary schools had significantly lower graduation rates. None of the 
What Should Be the Federal Role  CAHRS WP02-08 
  
 
Page 32 
other policy variables had statistically significant effects.  Nevertheless, point estimates for 
MCEs and CBEEES suggest that they probably lower graduation rates. 
Let us now review the empirical findings regarding the efficacy of the different 
components of standards-based reform.    States that reward schools for success and sanction 
schools that are failing had significantly higher achievement levels.  These results are 
consistent with Grissmer et al’s (2000) finding that the biggest gains in NAEP mathematics 
scores were in North Carolina and Texas—the two states that established the nation’s most 
comprehensive systems of school and student accountability in the early 1990s.  Students in 
MCE states were significantly (about 2 to 4 percentage points) more likely to attend college in 
1993/94 and employers responded to the their enhanced reputation by paying them 9 percent 
more.   The effects of MCEs on achievement in 8th grade and test scores gains during high 
school were small and often not statistically significant.   Curriculum-based external exit exam 
systems appear to have had by far the largest impacts on test scores.  Achievement levels at 
the end of high school were roughly one grade level equivalent ahead of comparable states. 
Increases in the number of academic courses required for graduation also had substantial 
effects on learning during high school. 
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Figure 5-- Probability of Not Getting a Diploma or GED
by 8th grade GPA & State Minimum Competency Exam
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Figure 6--’Effects’ of State Policies on 
Public High School Completion Rates in 1998
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Fig. 7--’Effects’ of State Policies on the Percent of 17 year 
olds Getting a High School Diploma: 1997-99
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V.    How can the Federal Government Help States Develop an Effective Standards-Based 
Reform Strategy for Secondary Schools 
 The federal government pays only a tiny portion of the costs of secondary education.  
How can it help reform secondary education and assist states in developing accountability 
mechanisms that produce better outcomes? 
 The first step has already been taken.  The 2001 reauthorization of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act, the “No Child Left Behind” Act, requires states to test students at 
least once in grades 10-12 in reading, mathematics and science and to develop accountability 
systems based in part on that data.  The implementation of this legislation will have profound 
effects on how standards-based reform is applied to high schools.   The regulations for “No 
Child Left Behind”, therefore, need to be informed by a vision of how standards based reform 
and high school reform should proceed.   Consequently, this chapter will articulate a vision of 
how American high schools should be reformed based on the international and domestic 
evidence described in the first three sections of the paper.  This vision is derived from and an 
extension of the administration’s vision for the “No Child Left Behind” Act.   As the discussion 
proceeds recommendations for those writing the regulations for “No Child Left Behind” will be 
presented in 12 point bold Italics.   New federal initiatives suggested by the argument will also 
be presented in 12 point bold Italics. 
It is important to remember, however, that state governments are in charge here.  They 
have constitutional responsibility for education and control the funding and the levers of 
authority that guide both K-12 and post-secondary education.  It is their vision that will ultimately 
be implemented.  Different states will make different choices.  Some states use end-of-course 
exams to measure student achievement in high school [see Table 2].  Others use end-of-grade 
exams.  Some have chosen to make high school graduation dependent on passing a state high 
school graduation test.  Others have rejected high-stakes graduation tests.  Michigan awards 
scholarships to students who demonstrate proficiency on MEAP high school tests.  Connecticut 
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encourages employers and colleges to use state tests in their hiring and admissions decisions 
[see Table 3]. It would be a mistake for the federal government to attempt to use the 
regulations and grants for implementing  “No Child Left Behind” (NCLB) to force all states to 
adopt a particular policy mix.  The states are laboratories of democracy.  Studying their 
contrasting experiences will teach us a great deal about what works and what doesn’t. 
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Table 3:  
Statewide Examinations that Determine Eligibility for Honors Diplomas or Scholarships 
State 
Yr 
Announ
ced 
Subjects 
(year first administered) 
Score 
On  
Tran- 
script 
Part 
of 
Grade 
Do 
Teacher
s 
Grade 
Exam? 
Honors 
Diploma 
based 
on 
EOGE 
When 
HSGT 
Req. 
begins 
Month 
of First 
Admini-
stration 
Other Rewards for Student Achievement 
Ohio 1987 
12th Grade tests in Reading, 
Science, Math and Civics 
(1994-6) 
Yes No No Yes In part 1994 Feb. 
$500 scholarship based on EOCE. Honors 
Diploma req. rigorous courses & either GPA gt 
3.5 or 12th grade exams or ACT. 
Conn. 1991 10
th
 Grade tests in English, 
Math and Science (1994) Yes No No Yes none May  
Michigan  
11th Grade tests in Math, 
Reading, Science and 
Writing (1997), Social 
Studies (1999) 
Yes No No 
1996 
(Subject-
-by –
subject) 
none March Beginning with 1999 graduates a $2500 
scholarship is awarded based on EOG exams. 
Penn. 1991 11
th
 Grade tests in reading, 
writing, math (1999) some No No 2003 none   
Oregon 1991 
10th grade tests in English & 
Math (1996), Science (1999), 
Social Studies (2003) 
Most. 
Expect 
an 
Increase 
Some teachers blind 
2001 
(propose 
Subj--by 
–subject) 
none 
Feb (PA) 
April 
(MC) 
Certif. of Initial Mastery  based on English & 
math in 2001, add Science in 2002, add Arts 
in 2003, add 2nd Lang in 2005, & Soc. Studies 
in 2006. 
Illinois 1997 
11th Grade tests in reading, 
writing, math, science & 
social science (2001) 
Yes 
(Re-
quired) 
No No 
2002 
(Subj--by 
–subject) 
none   
 
Phase in of High School Graduation Test 
Mass. 1993 10
th
 Grade tests in English, 
Math, & Science  (1998) 
No 
Temp No No 2000 2003 May 
On 3/28/00 State Bd of Ed decided to move 
up the first class getting Certificate of Mastery 
to 2000. Based on either EOG scores, AP or 
SAT 2’s. 
Wisconsin 1997 
10th Grade tests in reading, 
writing, math, science &  
social science (2002) 
Yes No No No 2004 Spring 
1997 legislation with HGST repealed in 1999. 
Local Districts will set graduation standards 
based on HGST and other indicators of 
student achievement 
Indiana 1993 10
th
 grade tests in English 
and mathematics (1997) Most No No No 2000 Sept. 
May also meet graduation requirement by 
getting a C or better in all Core 40 college 
prep courses or demonstrate 9th grade 
achievement in other way. 
Honors Diploma based on Curriculum 
What Should Be the Federal Role  CAHRS WP02-08 
  
 
Page 39 
The Optimal Design of Standards-Based Reform for High Schools: 
Systems that hold high schools accountable for student learning are particularly difficult to 
design for five reasons.  First, high schools have multiple goals.  Some of these goals--
achievement in core academic subjects and high graduation rates—apply to all schools and to all 
students.  But others goals—speaking a foreign language, occupational competency, developing 
artistic talent and leadership skills—are goals that some students choose to pursue but many do 
not.  If these specialist achievements are not recognized in the accountability system, 
administrators may be pressed to redirect resources away from these elements of the high school 
program.  On the other hand, it is not easy to measure these student accomplishments 
comparably across schools.  One would have to report both how many students were pursuing 
each goal and the standard achieved by these students.   In applied technology, for example, 
one might report indicators such as (a) number of students taking two or more courses in each 
vocational specialization, (b) occupational skill certificates awarded to these students, (c) 
proportion of vocational students in school or employment six months after graduation, (d) 
proportion working or studying in the occupational field they studied in high school and (e) wage 
rate of those who are working full-time after high school.  Implementation of the “No Child 
Left Behind” legislation should allow and indeed encourage states to include subjects 
other than English, mathematics and science in high school accountability systems. 
Secondly, measuring achievement in core academic subjects is more difficult for high 
school students than for elementary school students.  Standards-based reform requires 
agreement at the state level on content standards for each subject, alignment of instruction with 
these content standards and alignment of assessments with both content standards and 
instruction.  But unlike primary schools and middle schools, high schools lack a sequenced 
academic curriculum that everyone takes together. Students choose which math and science 
courses to take and when to take them.  High achieving students often accelerate when they take 
math and science courses. How, then, does one design a challenging science test for tenth 
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graders?  Some take biology that year; others chemistry, physics, environmental science or earth 
science.  Still others take no science.19  A test covering all fields of science will inevitably be 
watered down and hold no one in particular accountable.  It will be unlikely to improve peer norms 
in science classes.  Separate assessments for each laboratory science course are a better 
way to bring accountability to high school science.  Federal regulations should encourage 
(but not require) states to assess high school science courses individually rather than in 
one generic test.  These exams would be administered at the end of each science course. 
The third difficulty is that high school tests measure the cumulative result of ten to twelve 
years of schooling, not just what has been learned since the student entered high school.  If 
students arrive in ninth grade not knowing how to read, it makes little sense to sanction the high 
school staff for a failure whose roots lie in the district’s elementary and middle schools.  This is 
one of the many reasons why school accountability systems need to measure value added and to 
give indicators of value added a central place in the definition of school quality.  Since test scores 
from seventh and eighth grade will be available, indicators of value added can be constructed.  
The first step is to estimate models predicting high school test scores as a function of the 
student’s 7th and 8th grade scores from a few years earlier.   The prediction of this model for each 
student would be subtracted from the student’s actual HST score and these deviations from the 
predicted score would be cumulated across all students in a school.  If the mean deviation is 
positive, the high school is doing a better than average job.  If the mean deviation is a large 
negative number, the school is failing to teach effectively.  Unfortunately, many states currently 
lack the centralized student record keeping systems that are necessary to construct the value-
added indicators described above.  However, testing contractors have the information and 
expertise necessary to develop such indicators and this task should be added to the other tasks 
performed by the state’s testing contractor.  States will need time to decide how it’s value 
added indicator should be defined, but NCLB regulations should require states to start the 
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development process and to eventually incorporate such indicators in their accountability 
system. 
 The fourth difficulty is that when a test is not part of a course’s grade or important to the 
student in some other way, many high school students fail to put much effort into answering all the 
questions correctly and completely.20  This doesn’t pose a problem when a state’s minimum 
competency high school graduation exam is used as the indicator of student achievement for high 
school accountability.  But only 20 states currently have minimum competency exams.  In most of 
the nation, tests that students have no reason to try hard on are the primary indicator of student 
achievement in school accountability systems.  When this is the case, school ratings may reflect 
the school’s success in getting students to try hard on state tests and rather than how much the 
students actually learned.   This reduces the validity of high school tests as measures of true 
student achievement and tends to make their use in accountability systems problematic. 
In the states that do not have high-stakes minimum competency exam graduation 
requirements, students can be induced to put effort into a school accountability test by giving them 
a stake in doing well.  Where there are end-of-course exams or end-of-grade exams in 
mathematics and English, the state exam can become one of the midterms or finals of the course.   
Another way to make the tests count is to persuade state universities and community colleges to 
use them in admissions decisions (in place of or supplementary to the ACT and SAT-1 tests) and 
for deciding whether entering students must take remedial courses. Still another approach is to 
award merit-based scholarships to students who demonstrate proficiency or high proficiency on 
them as Michigan and Ohio have done.21 
The fifth problem in holding schools accountable is the low quality and low standards of 
many of the high school tests used in accountability systems.  While student motivation is unlikely 
to be a problem when MCE scores are used in accountability systems, there are other problems.  
These tests determine who has not reached the minimum standard necessary to graduate. To 
avoid a political backlash, cut scores must be set low enough to insure that fewer than 10 
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percent of students are denied a diploma because they have been unable to pass one of the 
MCE tests.  The performance level signaled by this cut score will be substantially below the 
standard we would like most students to achieve.  To maximize the reliability of this high stakes 
classification and to shorten the test, test developers often omit difficult questions that marginal 
students are unlikely to answer correctly.  As a result, scores obtained on most minimum 
competency exams do not describe the full range of student achievement the way Regents 
exams, AP exams, SAT-2s and teacher made exams do.  Teaching to such an MCE would 
dumb down the curriculum for the majority of students who are not at risk of failing. 
“No Child Left Behind” tries to prevent this problem from arising by adding a provision to 
the ESEA rules on state standards and assessment. The law requires that a state’s academic 
standards include challenging student academic achievement standards that are aligned with 
the state’s academic content standards; describe 2 levels of high achievement (proficient and 
advanced) that determine how well children are mastering the material in the state’s academic 
content standards; and describe a third level of achievement (basic) to provide complete 
information about the progress of lower-achieving children toward mastering the proficient and 
advanced levels of achievement {Section 1111 (b)(1)(D)(ii)}. 
Both the effects of standards-based reform and its long-term political viability depend on 
the quality and credibility of the exams used to measure student achievement. Consequently, 
implementation of the “No Child Left Behind” legislation should give priority to the development 
of high quality exams that are aligned with state learning standards in the subject and that 
require students to write essays, do multi-step math problems, conduct science experiments, 
etc.  A great deal of work needs to be done.  According to the Quality Counts 2002 report, six 
states have not yet developed content standards for high school mathematics and nine states 
have not developed content standards for high school science. Criterion-referenced high school 
assessments aligned with state standards are not available in eight states for mathematics and 
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in twenty-seven states for science.  Only sixteen states use extended-response questions in 
their assessments of mathematics, science or social studies. 
State departments of education (or their contractor) would develop the exams and the 
rubrics for grading extended answer portions of the exam and then train teams of teachers from 
the state to do the grading.22 Each paper should be read at least twice.  Grading exams 
collectively is invaluable professional development so as many teachers as possible should be 
recruited on a rotating basis.  They should get a generous honorarium for the work. Grading 
should be done a week or so after testing so that students who fail the test can be put in an 
after-school program or retake the course in summer school.   Quality exams take longer to 
develop, longer to take and longer to grade.  Inevitably, they are more expensive. 
How does the federal government discretely influence the choices the states make?  
The first step is to employ the bully pulpit.  The President or the Secretary of Education should 
give a speech laying out his vision of how states should implement the testing provisions of the 
“No Child Left Behind” Act.  At the beginning of the speech, he would say that states are the 
laboratories of democracy and he wants states to develop their own unique way of assessing 
student achievement.  He would recommend a system with the following features: 
• Tests that are comparable enough from year to year so that information is provided 
not only on how much Johnny knows, but how much he learned since last year.  This 
is the kind of information that is needed to fairly assess a school’s value added in the 
face of high rates of student turnover and large differences in the reading skills and 
family background of students entering a school. 
• The legislation requires that the tests provide “descriptive” and “diagnostic” 
information on the achievement of individual students. If diagnostic information is to 
be helpful, it needs to be reported back to the school soon after test administration 
so that remediation can begin immediately.  It is unacceptable to wait until the end of 
the summer to get test results back. 
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• Essays and extended response answers are an important part of the state’s 
assessment and are graded by teachers, not by poorly trained temporary workers 
who have not completed college and are not residents of the state. 
• Test Security—Whenever stakes are attached to test results, test security has to be 
a concern.  European high school exit exams, SATs, ACTs and New York State 
Regents exams are all administered on the same day during a very small time 
window.  New versions of the exam are constructed for each test administration.  
Similar security precautions are needed for state sponsored end-of-course exams 
and minimum competency exams. 
We have to expect that many teachers will teach students how to handle the types of 
questions we put on the exam.  The better the exam, the better the teaching will be.   
Consequently, NCLB language requiring states to develop “challenging student academic 
achievement standards” should be interpreted as meaning that the tests contain challenging 
content where students must do multi-step problems showing their work and explain their 
reasoning on science problems.   All high school assessments should be peer-reviewed for 
alignment and quality. Implementation of the “No Child Left Behind” legislation should 
discourage states from buying cheap off-the-shelf tests that are poorly aligned with state 
learning standards in the subject.  For example, all states include writing in their high school 
learning standards.  NCLB regulations should require all states to develop an assessment of 
writing skills during high school that actually involves writing essays. 
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State university and community college systems need to work with state departments of 
education to improve the quality of the state achievement exams for high school students and 
to develop ways of using these exams for admissions and placement purposes. The 
Department of Education should encourage such collaborations by establishing a grant 
program to fund them.  The primary objective of the collaboration is to persuade the 
state’s public institutions of higher education to use the end-of-course and high school 
graduation tests administered by the state’s K-12 system when they make admissions 
and placement decisions.  Community college and university systems that use their 
state’s high school exit exams and end-of–course exams to help make admissions and 
placement decisions should have input into the design and revision of state tests.  Since 
ninety percent of high school students aspire to go to college and seventy percent 
actually attend, it makes a great deal of sense to involve college teachers and 
administrators in the design of high school exams. These grants could help states 
develop ways to use high school graduation tests and end-of-course exams in deciding 
on admissions to state universities and colleges and determining placement of freshman 
in remedial or advanced courses. 
Optimal Design of Standards-Based Reform for High School Students: 
Minimum Competency Exam (MCE) high school graduation requirements are the most 
common way that states make students accountable for learning.  Studies of the effect of 
MCEs have found that they increase college attendance and post high school earnings but 
have little effect on test score gains during high school and lower the probability that low GPA 
students get a high school diploma.  A number of states appear to be following a strategy of 
driving their educational systems to higher standards by periodically revising their MCE in order 
to set progressively higher minimum standards. 
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Minimum Competency Exams create a High Stakes for a Few Students System:  
State tests determine or influence getting a diploma or promotion to the next grade but 
only a small minority of students are really at risk of being retained or being denied a diploma.  
One benefit of High Stakes for a Few is that it focuses school efforts on helping its most poorly 
prepared students.  Critics of MCEs point to a number of problems with this approach: 
a. There are other ways of getting schools to expend more energy on teaching lagging 
students.   “Stakes for School systems” can be designed to accomplish this purpose. 
b. Many perceive it to be unfair to, in Gary Orfield’s words, “ punish” students whose low 
test scores are the result [at least in part] of attending under funded poorly staffed 
schools.  [I am not persuaded by Orfield’s rhetoric because the benefits—higher wages 
and greater college attendance—of high school graduation tests are so large, they 
outweigh the losses experienced by the small number of students who fail to graduate 
because they cannot meet the standards.  Nevertheless, initiatives that increase or 
modify the stakes for students need to be framed in a way that responds to this rhetoric.] 
c. Most students put insufficient effort into their studies and avoid demanding courses, so 
incentives need to be strengthened for almost all students not just those who do poorly 
on tests. 
d. Most students pass the MCE on the first try.  Once they pass, the stimulus to studying and 
paying attention in class generated by the MCE goes away.  Only in the minority of very 
troubled schools where the majority of students are at risk of failing the MCE is student 
culture likely to be changed by the high stakes test. 
e. Who is held accountable when students fail?   Primarily the student.  Possibly the 
principal.  In big high schools principals have limited ability to influence how their 
teachers teach.  In most cases individual teachers are not considered responsible for 
how students in their class this term do on MCEs.  Some MCEs are first administered in 
the fall.  MCEs typically cover material studied in many different courses taught by 
different teachers.  When everyone is responsible for student performance, no one 
is responsible. 
f. The idea behind MCEs is that we fix the minimum graduation standard and then vary the 
time students devote to learning.   By spending extra time at learning tasks, lagging 
students eventually achieve the higher standard.  This is an attractive strategy.   Fifteen 
of seventeen states with MCEs in 2001 required schools to provide remediation for 
students failing state MCE exams (Quality Counts 2002, p 77).  Nevertheless, many 
What Should Be the Federal Role  CAHRS WP02-08 
  
 
Page 47 
school districts are not giving lagging students the extra learning opportunities after 
school and during the summer that they need to be successful. 
g. MCE tests are designed to identify students whose achievement is so low they should not 
be awarded a diploma.  To increase the reliability of this classification, test developers 
omit questions that the marginal students are unlikely to be able to answer.  If regular 
instruction comes to focus on preparing students for the MCE test, the majority of the 
students who are not at risk of failing will be getting a diluted and undemanding 
curriculum. 
  
MCE graduation requirements tend to be politically controversial.   Raising the bar often 
seems impossible because failure rates on pilot administrations of new MCEs are typically very 
high.  State education leaders in Arizona, Wisconsin and Massachusetts have recently been 
forced to either postpone the MCE graduation requirement or reduce the stringency of the 
testing requirement.  Whatever ones personal view of how the benefits of MCEs compare to 
their costs, it is clear that the political culture of many states rules out this policy option.   If a 
state does not want to make the high school diploma contingent on passing a MCE test, what 
can it do to induce high school students to take learning seriously?   The next subsection 
describes a series of powerful ways of giving students a bigger stake in learning without 
imposing high stakes negative consequences on them if they are unsuccessful. 
Moderate Stakes for Everyone should be the objective, not high stakes for the few.   A 
number of ideas for generating moderate rewards for learning are described below.  While 
states with no MCE have the greatest need to implement these approaches, these proposals 
can improve motivation and student culture in MCE states as well. 
1. Make the consequences of doing poorly on state tests less draconian.  Retention 
should be reserved for only the most egregious cases and only after extra time remediation 
efforts have been tried and failed.  Instead of being retained, students who are falling 
behind should be required to participate in: 
*After-School Programs   *Saturday School Programs   *Summer School Programs 
 
Consequences such as these are likely to be at least as strong an incentive to study hard 
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as the threat of retention.  Yet they do not “punish” the student, they help remedy the poor reading 
skills etc. that are the source of the problem.  Requiring students to participate in extra-time 
learning opportunities should not depend solely on scores on state tests.  Teachers should also 
have input in a decision made either by the principal or a committee. 
The Administration should propose a further major expansion of the program of 
grants to school districts to provide expanded after-school and summer school 
opportunities for children who are not doing well in school.  The Education Secretary and 
the President should encourage school districts that are “ending social promotion” to give 
lagging students at least one full year of after-school and summer school remediation 
before holding a student back.  States should be encouraged to pass laws giving school 
districts the authority to require students who are falling behind to attend school during 
the summer. 
2. The administration should push for a big expansion in the number of students taking 
Advanced Placement (AP) and International Baccalaureate (IB) courses and 
examinations.23  This can be accomplished by funding summer institutes for the 
teachers of AP and IB courses and by negotiating a reduction in the fee for taking the 
AP and IB examinations.  The U.S. Department of Education should study and evaluate 
state efforts to offer internet-based AP courses to students attending small high 
schools and fund enhancements and quality improvements of these courses.  Grants 
should be given to states that have developed exemplary courses so that students 
from other states can take the course for a nominal fee.  Private non-profit 
organizations that have developed exemplary Internet courses should also be allowed 
to compete for these grants. 
3. Graduated Rewards for Doing Well on State Tests.   The rewards should not be large 
amounts of money for exceeding a cutoff.  They should be graduated and based on absolute 
performance, not performance relative to the other students in the school.   All of these ideas 
have already been implemented by a few states [see Table 3].  Additional states should 
implement these policies. 
• Scores on state tests should be part of the final grade in the course.   This will 
require that state tests be quickly graded before the end of the school year. 
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• Scores on state tests should be on the high school transcript 
• Differentiated diplomas or honors certifications on the existing diploma.  Student 
eligibility for honors diploma certifications should depend (at least in part) on their 
performance on external exams and possibly the rigor of the courses being taken.  
They should not depend on an unweighted GPA.  If a MCE is in place, students who fail 
the MCE but get the requisite number of Carnegie units should get a certificate of 
completion and be allowed to walk across the stage. 
• Merit Scholarships similar to the Michigan Merit Award that are based on students’ 
grades on a battery of the state’s external exams.  They should be awarded at 
assemblies attended by parents.  These merit scholarships would not have to be for 
large amounts of money.  Better to award lots of them than award large stipends.  The 
size of the award could depend on financial need. This would compensate for the 
advantages that students with wealthy parents have in the competition for these 
scholarships.  Once a state has implemented a set of reliable high quality 
assessments aligned with state content standards for grades 9 through 12, the 
federal government should offer to match state funds allocated to a state merit 
scholarship program that selects awardees largely on the basis of scores on the 
state assessments.  Students in private high schools should be eligible for these 
awards if the bulk of students at the school participate in the state’s testing 
program. In the first year of the state’s merit scholarship program the federal 
contribution might be formula based [e.g. $500 per high school graduate]. States 
would structure the eligibility rules so that roughly one-third of high school 
graduates would be able to receive the merit scholarship in the first year.  The 
amount of the award would vary with achievement level and financial need, but 
everyone would get a minimum of $500.  Thus, the maximum award for low-
income students with very high scores might be as high as $10,000.  Over time 
achievement will improve and the share of graduates meeting the standard and 
receiving the scholarship will rise as well.  The federal contribution would 
increase proportionately. 
• Recruit and publicize employers who promise to pay students with the honors 
certifications a higher wage.  Connecticut has done exactly this. 
• Persuade State Colleges and Universities to announce that they use grades on 
state tests in admission and placement decisions. 
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4. America’s premier high stakes tests, the SAT-I and ACT, are not comprehensive measures of 
learning during high school.24   The energy that students devote to cracking the SAT-1 would 
be better spent reading widely and learning to write coherently, to think scientifically, to 
analyze and appreciate great literature and to converse in a foreign language.  These are the 
true objectives of a high school education. The high stakes attached to the SAT-1 and the 
ACT, however, tend to direct student energy away from developing these important skills and 
weakens the ability of teachers to set high standards themselves. 
Colleges should redirect the energy of high school students towards our true educational 
objectives by dropping the SAT-1 and ACT tests and replacing them with state sponsored 
curriculum-based end-of-course exams like New York State’s Regents exams and/or national 
subject specific achievement exams like the SAT-2, Advanced Placement and International 
Baccalaureate exams (Kirst 2001).    Changing admissions criteria in this way will help 
convince students, parents and school administrators that better teaching, more challenging 
courses and higher achievement will be perceived and rewarded by the colleges and 
universities. 
The Secretary of Education should give a speech supporting the proposal by the 
President of the University of California, Richard Atkinson, to substitute achievement 
exams like the SAT-2, AP exams and state end-of-course exams for the SAT-1 and ACT 
exams in admissions and class placement decisions of California’s state colleges and 
universities.  In order to accelerate the transition from the SAT-1 to state developed 
achievement tests, the Office of Education Research and Improvement should fund 
studies that (a) compare the validity of state achievement tests, SAT-2, SAT-1 and ACT 
tests in predicting college grades and degree completion and (b) empirically compare 
the scoring standards of achievement exams from neighboring states. 
The Department of Education should also make grants to collaborations between state 
community college systems, state university systems and state education 
departments to develop ways to use state high school graduation tests reflecting high 
standards (e.g. MCAS, MEAP, the SOLs, etc.) and end-of-course exams in deciding on 
admissions to state universities and colleges and for placement of freshman in 
remedial or advanced courses in community colleges, technical institutes and state 
universities.  Funding priority should go to states that establish a permanent 
institutional mechanism for regular discussions between K-12 and higher education 
regarding the coordination of high school graduation requirements and tests with 
college admissions and placement tests and requirements. 
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High schools should hold all students to higher standards.  Poorly prepared students need 
to be told of their deficiencies early in high school when there is time to remedy them.  If that is 
done, the share of college freshman with the skills and knowledge necessary to succeed will rise 
and many more will realize their goal of getting a bachelors degree. 
5.    End-of-Course Exams (EOCEs) should be the core of accountability for high school 
students.   The regression analysis of state NAEP test scores and dropout rates 
summarized in section 3 of this paper found that end-of-course exams had more positive 
effects on learning and retention than high stakes MCEs and the no/low stakes end-of-
grade exams.  Why?  Because: 
a. Responsibility for student performance on a particular exam is focused on just 
one or a small group of teachers. 
b. The classroom culture is improved because everyone is taking the same exam 
and it will be part of the student’s grade in the course.  EOCEs signal the full range of 
achievement in the subject; so everyone has an incentive to study harder in order to do better 
on the test; not just the students at risk of failing the course. 
c. Student attitudes towards that teacher are improved because she becomes a 
coach who helps the class succeed on the state exam.   Her role shifts from being a judge 
towards being a mentor.   New York State has an EOCE system.  Connecticut, 
Massachusetts and New Jersey do not.  Contrasting NY and its neighbors allows us to test 
this assertion.  Surveys of 35,000 students in these states by the Educational Excellence 
alliance found that attitudes toward teachers were more positive in New York. When students 
were asked what motivated them to study hard, New Yorkers were 30 percent more likely to 
respond “to please or impress my teacher,” 17 percent more likely to say ‘my teachers 
encourage me to work hard.’ and 14 percent more likely to say “the teacher demands it.”  
New York students were also significantly more likely to say “my teachers grade me fairly”, 
“my teachers maintain good discipline in the classroom” and that classes are “interesting.” 
d. Student peer support for studying and classroom engagement increases.   Peer 
support of disruptive students decreases.   New York students were 10 percent more 
likely to say, “My friends think it is important for me to do well in [science, math, English] at 
school.” They were nearly 25 percent more likely to be annoyed when “other students talk or 
joke around in class” or “try to get the teacher off track.”   In addition New York students were 
significantly more likely to say they were motivated by a desire to learn the material and more 
likely to report they were interested in what they were studying and more likely to talk with 
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their friends outside of class about what they were studying. The better attitudes translated 
into better behavior.  New York students spent significantly more time studying for history 
exams, more time doing homework and did a larger share of the homework that was 
assigned.  They also paid closer attention in class and contributed to class discussion more 
frequently. 
e. EOCEs assess more difficult material. Since EOCEs are supposed to measure and 
signal the full range of achievement in the subject, they contain more difficult questions and 
problems. This induces teachers to spend more time on cognitively demanding skills and 
topics 
f. Students take the course when they are ready for it.    Alignment between 
instruction and the exam is maximized. 
g. Teachers grade the exam.  Grading exams with essays and other constructed 
response questions is a very effective form of professional development.  In NY, teachers 
participate in the grading of their own student’s exams, so they get good feedback on where 
their teaching failed. 
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